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Abstract
We provide a new characterization of implementability of reduced
form mechanisms in terms of straightforward second-order stochastic
dominance. In addition, we present a simple proof of Matthews’ (1984)
conjecture, proved by Border (1991), on implementability.
1 Introduction
In mechanism design contexts, such as those with type-dependent outside op-
tions, it is sometimes more natural and convenient to optimize over reduced
form mechanisms—i.e., interim probability assignments and cost functions—
rather than the underlying mechanisms themselves.1 Reduced form mech-
anisms also play a useful role in the literature on the equivalence between
Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation.2 In contexts such as these,
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1it is important to know when a reduced form mechanism can actually be
implemented. Maskin and Riley (1984) posed and studied this question, and
obtained a partial solution. Matthews (1984) made further progress and in
addition conjectured that an intuitive inequality constraint is necessary and
suﬃcient for implementability. Border (1991) ﬁnally solved the problem by
proving Matthews’ conjecture.
The purpose of the present note is twofold. First, we provide an al-
ternative characterization of implementability in terms of straightforward
second-order stochastic dominance,3 and second, we oﬀer a simpler, more di-
rect proof of Matthews’ conjecture. Our work, like all of the work mentioned
above, focuses on the classic mechanism design setting in which there is a
single indivisible object to be allocated to one of n ex-ante symmetric agents,
each of whom has quasi-linear utility and whose private information, which
may be quite general, is drawn independently from a common distribution.4
2 Results
The underlying probability space (the “type space”) is5 (T,T ,λ). The num-
ber of agents is n. Because the implementability question relates only to a
mechanism’s probability assignment function, we deﬁne a mechanism here in
these terms only.6 Thus, a mechanism consists of n functions q1,q2,...,qn,
with qi : T n → [0,1] for each i = 1,2,...,n, such that
Pn
i=1 qi(t1,t2,...,tn) ≤ 1
for every t1,t2,...,tn in T; here qi(t1,t2,...,tn) is the probability that agent
i gets the object when the reported types are t1,t2,...,tn. A mechanism
is symmetric if qi(tπ(1),tπ(2),...,tπ(n)) = qπ(i)(t1,t2,...,tn) for every permu-
tation π of {1,2,...,n} and every agent i = 1,2,...,n; i.e., the “names”
(1,2,...,n) of the agents do not matter. A symmetric mechanism is thus
given by a function q ≡ q1 : T n → [0,1] such that q(t1,t2,...,tn) is invari-
3Which may be useful when optimizing; see Remark (c) below.
4For the case of asymmetric agents with ﬁnite type spaces, see Border (2007).
5There are no requirements on the probability space. All functions will be assumed
measurable, and all statements to hold almost surely.
6Thus the cost function as well as additional constraints (such as participation con-
straints), which are not important for our purposes, are left unspeciﬁed.
2ant to permutations of (t2,...,tn) and
P
i qi ≤ 1, where qi(t1,t2,...,tn) :=
q(ti,t2,...,ti−1,t1,ti+1,...,tn) (i.e., interchange the ﬁrst and the ith coordi-
nates); q(t1,t2,...,tn) is the probability that an agent whose type is t1 gets
the object when the other agents are of types t2,...,tn.
A reduced form is a mapping Q : T → [0,1]. A reduced form Q is
implementable if there exists a symmetric mechanism given by q : T n → [0,1]
such that Q(t) =
R
Tn−1 q(t,t2,...,tn)dλ(t2)··· dλ(tn) for all t ∈ T; i.e., Q(t)
is the overall probability that an agent of type t gets the object. In this case
we say that Q is the reduced form of q, or that q generates Q. Our concern
is whether a given reduced form Q is implementable.7
As will be shown, an important special case consists of the type space
([0,1],B,λ
∗), with λ
∗ the Lebesgue measure, and q∗(t1,t2,...,tn) = 1 if t1 >
max{t2,...,tn}, and q∗(t1,t2,...,tn) = 0 otherwise. That is, the agents’ types
are each uniformly distributed on [0,1] and the mechanism gives the object
to the agent whose type is highest. Its reduced form is easily seen to be
Q∗(t) = tn−1 for all t ∈ [0,1] (when n = 2, the distribution of Q∗ is uniform
on [0,1]).
Theorem 1 The following conditions on Q : T → [0,1] are equivalent:
(i) Q is implementable; i.e., it is the reduced form of a symmetric mecha-
nism.











(iii) −Q second-order stochastically dominates −Q∗.
7The symmetry requirement here is somewhat more demanding than the one in Maskin
and Riley (1984) and Border (1991), who do not require the invariance of q(t1,t2,...,tn)
with respect to permutations of (t2,...,tn). Ours is however the natural symmetry re-
quirement when all agents are symmetric, and in particular it does not aﬀect the imple-
mentability of a reduced form Q, since averaging all n! permutations of a mechanism—i.e.,
˜ qi(t1,...,tn) := (1/n!)
P
π qπ−1(i)(tπ(1),tπ(2),...,tπ(n))—yields a symmetric mechanism in
our sense.
8[Q < α] is short for {t ∈ T : Q(t) < α}; similarly for the other events.
3Remarks.
(a) Condition (ii) is due to Matthews (1984);9 Border (1991) shows the
equivalence of (i) and (ii); condition (iii) is new.
(b) Condition (iii) means that for every increasing and concave function
u : [0,1] → R we have10 E[u(−Q)] ≥ E[u(−Q∗)]; equivalently, for every














In terms of distributions, this amounts to Q∗ being obtained from Q
by increasing values (pointwise) and applying mean-preserving spreads (see
Hadar and Russell 1969, Hanoch and Levy 1969, Rothschild and Stiglitz
1970, and the book of Shaked and Shanthikumar 2010).
Equivalently, there exists a probability space (Ω,F,P) and two random
variables X and Y deﬁned on it, such that X and Q have the same dis-
tribution, Y and Q∗ have the same distribution, and11 E[Y |X] ≥ X; this
construct is known as coupling (see Strassen 1965, Theorem 9; Machina and
Pratt 1997, Theorem 3′; Shaked and Shanthikumar 2010, Theorem 4.A.5).
(c) An immediate consequence of (iii) and (2) is that, for each increasing
and convex function v, the maximum of E[v(Q)] over all implementable Q
is attained at Q∗ and equals
R 1
0 v(tn−1)dt.
9The fact that it suﬃces to consider the inequality (1) only on sets of the form [Q > α],
rather than on all measurable sets as in Matthews (1984), is immediate (see Proposition
3.2 of Border 1991).
10E denotes expectation (with respect to the appropriate probability measure: λ for Q,
and λ
∗ for Q∗).
11I.e., P[X ≤ α] = λ[Q ≤ α] and P[Y ≤ α] = λ
∗ [Q∗ ≤ α] = α1/(n−1) for every α ∈
[0,1]. The change from X to Y can be understood as increasing values pointwise (from X
to E[Y |X]) and applying mean-preserving spreads (from E[Y |X] to Y ).
4Proof of Theorem 1. 12
• (i) implies (ii). As in Matthews (1984) and Border (1991, Lemma
5.1), using symmetry and
P
i qi ≤ 1 yields for any measurable A ⊂ T, in





















= 1 − (λ[T\A])
n .
• (ii) implies (iii). Put p := λ[Q ≤ α]; we have14
Z
T
[Q(t) − α]+ dλ(t) =
Z
[Q>α]




























∗(t) − α]+ dλ
∗(t),
where the ﬁrst inequality is (1), and the second is the classical Young’s in-
equality15 αp ≤ (1/n)pn+((n−1)/n)αn/(n−1). Hence
R
T [Q(t) − α]+ dλ(t) ≤
R
T∗ [Q∗(t) − α]+ dλ
∗(t) for all α ∈ [0,1], which is equivalent to (2) since every
increasing convex function v (with v(0) = 0, which does not aﬀect (2)) lies
in the closed convex cone generated by the functions φα(x) := [x − α]+ for
all α ∈ [0,1]. 16
• (iii) implies (i). Assume that −Q second-order stochastically dom-
inates −Q∗. Applying coupling (see Remark (b)) yields a probability space
12Showing that conditions (ii) and (iii) are each necessary for the implementability of
Q is quite straightforward; the diﬃculty lies in proving that these conditions are suﬃcient
(cf. “(iii) implies (i)”).
131W denotes the indicator of the event W.
14[x]+ := max{x,0}.
15Which follows, for instance, from the concavity of log (after applying log to both
sides).
16While for each α the inequality in (3), which can be written as
R
[Q>α] Q(t)dλ(t) ≤
1/n + ((n − 1)/n)αn/(n−1) − αλ[Q ≤ α], is strictly weaker than inequality (1), our result
implies that “(3) for all α” is equivalent to “(1) for all α” (this equivalence can also be
proved quite directly). Of course, our purpose here is to provide a simple and self-contained
proof of the equivalence of (i)–(iii).
5and two random variables X and Y deﬁned on it, such that X and Q have the
same distribution, Y and Q∗ have the same distribution, and E[Y |X] ≥ X.
Let (Xi,Yi), for i = 1,2,...,n, be n independent pairs of random variables,
all identically distributed and with the same distribution as the pair (X,Y ).
For each (t1,t2,...,tn) ∈ T n deﬁne the event
A(t1,t2,...,tn) := [X1 = Q(t1),X2 = Q(t2),...,Xn = Q(tn)],
and put17










i ˜ qi(t1,...,tn) =
P
i P[Yi > maxj =i Yj |A(t1,...,tn)] ≤ 1 (these n
events are disjoint), and so ˜ q : T n → [0,1] yields a symmetric mechanism.
Moreover, integrating over (t2,...,tn) ∈ T n−1 (recall that (Q(t2),...,Q(tn))
and (X2,...,Xn) have the same distribution) gives the reduced form ˜ Q of ˜ q:





¯ ¯ ¯X1 = Q(t1)
¸
. (4)
Now P[Yj ≤ y] = λ
∗[Q∗ ≤ y] = y1/(n−1) for every y ∈ [0,1] (since Yj has
the same distribution as Q∗), which implies that P[maxj =1 Yj ≤ y |X1] =
Qn
j=2 P[Yj ≤ y] =
¡
y1/(n−1)¢n−1 = y (we have used here the independence
over j). Thus maxj =1 Yj is uniformly distributed on [0,1], and moreover in-

















(recall that E[Y1|X1] ≥ X1). It only remains to rescale: put
q(t1,...,tn) := ˜ q(t1,...,tn)
Q(t1)
˜ Q(t1)
17We write P for the probability measure on the space on which all Xi and Yi are
deﬁned.
6(where we take 0 · 0/0 as 0); then q yields a symmetric mechanism (since
q ≤ ˜ q), and its reduced form is precisely the given Q. ¤
Finally, consider symmetric mechanisms that are maximal, in the sense
that
Pn
i=1 qi = 1. If Q is the reduced form, then E[
P
i qi] = nE[Q]. It follows
that an implementable reduced form Q is the reduced form of a maximal
mechanism if and only if E[Q] = 1/n; in this case we will also call Q maximal.
Clearly, for any implementable Q there is a maximal implementable ˜ Q with
˜ Q(t) ≥ Q(t) for all18 t. We have:
Corollary 2 The following conditions on Q : T → [0,1] with E[Q] = 1/n
are equivalent:
(i-Max) Q is the reduced form of a maximal symmetric mechanism.
(iii-Max) Q second-order stochastically dominates Q∗.
Proof. E[Q] = 1/n implies that E[Q] = E[Q∗] (since Q∗ is maximal), and
in this case condition (iii) is equivalent to (iii-Max): indeed, for the coupled
random variables X and Y of Remark (b), when E[X] = E[Y ] the conditions
E[Y |X] ≥ X, E[Y |X] = X, and E[Y |X] ≤ X, are all equivalent.19 ¤
Thus, Q∗ is obtained from an implementable maximal Q by mean-preserving
spreads; that is, Q∗ has the same distribution as Q + Z for some “noise” Z
that is uncorrelated with Q (i.e., E[Z |Q] = 0).
References
Border, K. C. (1991), “Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geo-
metric Approach,” Econometrica 59, 1175–1187.
Border, K. C. (2007), “Reduced Form Auctions Revisited,” Economic Theory
31, 167–181.
18If Q is the reduced form of q, then let ˜ Q be the reduced form of ˜ q, which is deﬁned by
˜ q := q/
P
i qi (if qi = 0 for all i then take ˜ q := 1/n).
19Informally: when the expectations are equal one cannot increase the values, and only
mean-preserving spreads can be used.
7Gershkov, A., B. Moldovanu, and A. Shi (2011), “Bayesian and Dominant
Strategy Implementation Revisited,” University of Bonn, unpublished
working paper.
Hadar, J. and W. Russell (1969), “Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects,”
American Economic Review 59, 25–34.
Hanoch, G. and H. Levy (1969), “The Eﬃciency Analysis of Choices Involv-
ing Risk,” Review of Economic Studies 36, 335–346.
Machina, M. and J. Pratt (1997), “Increasing Risk: Some Direct Construc-
tions,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 14, 103–127.
Manelli, A., and D. Vincent (2010), “Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Im-
plementation in the Independent, Private Values Model,” Econometrica
78, 1905–1939.
Maskin, E. S. and J. Riley (1984), “Optimal Auctions with Risk-Averse Buy-
ers,” Econometrica 52, 1473–1518.
Matthews, S. A. (1984), “On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auc-
tions,” Econometrica 52, 1519–1522.
Mierendorﬀ, K. (2009), “Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design with Dead-
lines, University of Bonn, unpublished working paper.
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz (1970), “Increasing Risk: I. A Deﬁnition,”
Journal of Economic Theory 2, 225–243.
Shaked, M. and J. G. Shanthikumar (2010), Stochastic Orders, Springer.
Strassen, V. (1965), “The Existence of Probability Measures with Given
Marginals,” The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36, 423–439.
8